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The Long-Term Implications of
Gonzaga v. Doe
By Bradford C. Mank

S

tate and local governments are
often responsible for disbursing
federal medical, educational,
and welfare beneits. What happens when they deny or revoke them
unfairly? Some recipients have used
42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a way to enforce
the underlying statutes. The Supreme
Court decision in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002),
made this more dificult. In doing so,
the Court adopted stringent rules for
the use of § 1983 to enforce any federal laws, including the nation’s civil
rights laws.
In Gonzaga, John Doe sued his
university for disclosing embarrassing
disciplinary records to unauthorized
third parties in violation of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g. He
sought to enforce FERPA through §
1983. The Supreme Court rejected
the suit, holding that FERPA did not
establish an individual right enforceable through § 1983. The majority
opinion adopted a rule that spending
legislation that provides federal funding to various state actors does not
ordinarily create individual enforceable rights under § 1983 unless
Congress demonstrates through
“clear and unambiguous terms”
that it intends to provide individual rights against a state actor that
accepts federal funding.” While previous cases had distinguished between
implied-right-of-action cases, where
evidence of congressional intent to
provide a private remedy is required,
and § 1983 cases, where a remedy
is generally presumed, the majority essentially treated these two types
of statutes as similarly requiring
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evidence of congressional intent. In
doing so, the majority applied the
stricter standard of implied right of
action cases to § 1983, thus weakening the power of § 1983.
Gonzaga is better understood
in light of prior decisions deining
implied rights of action and § 1983
suits. From 1964 until the late 1970s,
the Supreme Court and lower courts
found implied private causes of
action under several statutes. However, more recent Supreme Court
decisions have made it more dificult for courts to infer that a statute
establishes an implied private right
by requiring signiicant evidence of
congressional intent to create a private right of action. For instance, the
Court in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U.S. 275 (2001) held that there is
no private right of action to enforce
disparate impact regulations promulgated under § 602 of Title VI of the
1964 Civil Rights Act because neither § 602’s language nor subsequent
amendments to Title VI demonstrated
congressional intent to establish a
private cause of action to enforce §
602. Because the Court increasingly
rejected implied private rights of
action, plaintiffs instead turned to §
1983 suits to enforce statutory rights
that do not contain explicit remedies.
Before 1980, the Supreme Court
had only clearly allowed § 1983 suits
in cases alleging violations of constitutional rights. During the 1960s
and 1970s, Congress enacted statutes
establishing federal grant-in-aid programs to states and also used these
state programs to provide funds to
individual welfare beneiciaries. In
1980, the Supreme Court in Maine
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v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), held
that the plain meaning of the term
“and laws” in § 1983 referred to federal statutory rights and allowed
private individuals who were beneiciaries of those rights to bring
suit. However, judges concerned
with protecting states’ rights against
what they perceived as intrusive federal suits sought to limit Thiboutot’s
scope. Additionally, some judges
may have been concerned that § 1983
suits allowed plaintiffs to evade the
Court’s increasingly narrow view of
implied rights of action. Until the
Gonzaga decision, the Court’s decisions wavered between broad and
narrow readings of Thiboutot.
The Gonzaga decision adopted a
restrictive approach to use of § 1983
suits to require states to provide
welfare beneits and other rights to
individuals pursuant to federal funding statutes. The Court emphasized
that § 1983 suits may only enforce
clear statutory rights and may not be
used to enforce vaguer beneits or
interests, even if some earlier Court
decisions had suggested otherwise.
The majority argued that the test
for determining whether rights are
enforceable in § 1983 suits is whether
there is clear and unambiguous evidence of a right—an inquiry similar
to the one in private rights suits but
without the requirement for evidence
of congressional intent to create a private remedy. The Court stated that
Congress must clearly establish its
intent to create individual rights if it
wishes to alter the balance between
states and the federal government.
The assumption of deference to state
and local oficials in the absence of
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clear congressional intent to confer
individual rights arguably shifts the
burden of showing whether a remedy or cause of action exists from the
defendant in § 1983 suits to plaintiffs.
On the merits, the Court concluded
that Congress, in enacting FERPA,
only intended to establish aggregate
duties that educational institutions
owe to the Secretary of Education.
Any provisions in the statute for
administrative review of individual
complaints reinforced the Court’s
view that Congress wanted the Secretary of Education to resolve any
institutional failures, and not the
courts through § 1983 suits.
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined
by Justice Ginsburg, argued that the
majority’s requirement of clear textual evidence that Congress intended
to establish an individual right inappropriately adopted the test used in
implied-right-of-action cases, namely,
whether Congress intended to establish
a private remedy. He contended that
the majority had acknowledged that
this requirement was unnecessary in §
1983 cases because that statute allows
private enforcement of any statute creating a distinct federal right, even if
there is no private right of action under
the substantive statute. Although the
majority opinion asserted that it was
not importing the entire implied-rightof-action framework into the § 1983
arena, Justice Stevens argued that the
majority’s approach effectively did just
that and undermined the “presumptive
enforceability of rights under § 1983.”
Despite not explicitly changing
the existing three-part enforcement
test for § 1983, the Gonzaga decision imposes a signiicant burden
of proof on plaintiffs by requiring
unambiguous and explicit evidence
that Congress intended to create an
individual right beneiting a class
including the plaintiff. Although proposing to determine only whether
Congress intended to create an individual right, the majority in fact
blurred the distinction between rights
and remedies by improperly considering in a § 1983 case whether
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Congress intended to create a cause
of action. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
majority opinion in Gonzaga arguably weakened civil liberties by
undermining the principle that federal statutory rights are presumptively
enforceable through § 1983’s express
provision for enforcement of statutory rights. In exceptional cases, a
defendant can rebut the presumption
that all federal rights are enforceable
through § 1983. However, a defendant has the burden of demonstrating
that Congress has speciically foreclosed enforcement under § 1983 or
that a statute provides comprehensive
remedies incompatible with § 1983.
By blurring the line between rights
and remedies, the majority effectively
shifted the burden of proof from the
defendant to the plaintiff to demonstrate that § 1983 may be used to
enforce and provide a remedy for a
federal statutory right.
The Gonzaga case claims to clarify when federal statutory rights
may be enforced by § 1983. However, the majority opinion actually
did not clarify how courts should
determine what is “clear” and “unambiguous” evidence of congressional
intent to establish an individual right.
It is unclear whether the majority’s
test requires a textualist approach
or allows consideration of legislative history. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
majority opinion in Gonzaga largely
focused on the “text and structure” of
the FERPA provisions directly at issue,
although the Court briely considered
one aspect of the statute’s legislative history. Despite agreeing with the
Gonzaga majority that whether private
individuals may enforce a federal statute through § 1983 is “a question of
congressional intent,” Justice Breyer,
with whom Justice Souter joined, concurred in the judgment but disagreed
with the “majority’s presumption that
a right is conferred only if set forth
‘unambiguously’ in the statute’s ‘text
and structure.’” The majority opinion
never responded to Justice Breyer’s
claim that its approach was textualist.
The Gonzaga decision provides little
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guidance on which types of evidence
may be considered in determining
congressional intent to confer an individual right to sue.
The strict approach to demonstrating congressional intent in Gonzaga
would be less harmful to plaintiffs if
they may introduce evidence about a
statute’s legislative history because
that history often contains important evidence regarding congressional
intent or purpose. Additionally, as is
demonstrated by the Court’s decision in Wright v. City of Roanoke
Redevelopment & Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 430–32 (1987),
courts should consider agency regulations that deine the scope of a right as
long as there is suficient evidence that
Congress intended to establish an individual right in a statute. By rejecting a
strict textualist interpretation of congressional intent, courts can partially
protect the enforcement of statutory
rights under § 1983 despite the Gonzaga decision’s overly restrictive test.
Despite Gonzaga’s rigorous “clear
and unambiguous terms” test, lower
courts have divided over whether
§ 1983 suits may be brought by
individual beneiciaries under several federal statutes addressing a
wide range of issues. Lower courts
have considered claims by Medicaid patients, foster care children in
state care under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, nursing
home residents under the Nursing Home Reform Amendments,
patients under the Protection and
Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illnesses Act, and foster parents
under the Child Welfare Act. On the
other hand, lower court judges who
are not sympathetic to using § 1983
suits to enforce possible individual
welfare rights in federal spending
statutes against states can readily
rely on the strict test in the Gonzaga
decision to reject such suits. There
is not enough space in this article to
discuss each federal spending statute potentially enforceable through
§ 1983 suits. However, lower courts
continued on page 10
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The Supreme Court unanimously
reversed. Justice Alito wrote for the
Court and held that there was no
Fourth Amendment violation. The
Court said that the driver’s conduct
posed a “grave public safety risk,” and
the police were justiied in shooting
at the car to stop it. The Court said,
“the oficers need not stop shooting
until the threat has ended.” Moreover,
the Court said that even if there were
a Fourth Amendment violation, the
oficers were protected by qualiied
immunity because the law was not
clearly established that the conduct
violated the Fourth Amendment.
This is a disturbing holding. The
Supreme Court now has said that
whenever there is a high-speed chase
that oficers perceive could injure others—and that would seem to be true
of virtually all high-speed chases—
the police can shoot at the vehicle
and keep shooting until it stops. This
car was stopped for having only
one working headlight. If the driver
refused to stop, why not just let the
car go and track the driver down later?
Why should death be the punishment
for making the extremely poor choice
to begin a high-speed chase?

Finally, in Wood v. Moss, 134 S.
Ct. 2056 (2014), the Court found
that Secret Service agents were protected by qualiied immunity when
they engaged in viewpoint discrimination with regard to speakers.
In Oregon, Secret Service agents
allowed supporters of President
George W. Bush to be closer to
him and pushed his opponents further away. The law under the First
Amendment is clear that the government cannot discriminate among
speakers based on their views unless
strict scrutiny is met.
Nonetheless, the Court, in a unanimous decision with the majority
opinion written by Justice Ginsburg,
found that the Secret Service agents
were protected by qualiied immunity because there were no cases
on point concerning when Secret
Service agents violate the First
Amendment. But why must there be
cases that speciic when the law is
clearly established that viewpoint
discrimination violates the First
Amendment?
All of these cases were unanimous. All found qualiied immunity
because of the absence of a case on

point. Together, they show a Court
that is very protective of government oficials who are sued for money
damages and that has made it very
dificult for victims of constitutional
violations to recover.

standard that lower courts are quick
to ind does not exist even in the
most egregious situations. Students
must also explain how enduring the
harassment denied them equal access
to education. Why would the Court
make it more dificult for children to
demand protection and accountability
in schools than adults receive in the
workplace? Would the outcome have
been different if more women had
heard the cases?
Many commentators have written about how the Court has revived
Jim Crow and even pre–Civil War
legal theories to continue its assault
on civil rights. But Yolanda Rondon’s
article explains how the Court has
revived Korematsu in all but name
after 9/11.

American jurisprudence has historically expanded civil rights and
access to justice, but the articles in
this issue show that we are sliding
backward. Forces on this Court are
engaged in a steady assault on our
rights and remedies. They are limiting our access to the courts and
thus to justice itself. The assault
continues outside the headlines.
It continues in the cases we aren’t
watching . . . in the cases lurking in
the shadows.

Conclusion
Decisions about absolute and qualiied immunity receive little media
attention. But these are enormously
important doctrines that keep
injured individuals from recovering.
The promise of Marbury v. Madison—that “[t]he very essence of
civil liberty certainly consists in the
right of every individual to claim
the protection of the laws, whenever
he receives an injury”—is rendered
empty when absolute or qualiied
immunity precludes any remedy.
The Roberts Court has expanded
both absolute and qualiied immunity and thus has undermined
government accountability.
Erwin Chemerinsky is dean,
Distinguished Professor of Law, and
the Raymond Pryke Professor of First
Amendment Law at University of
California, Irvine School of Law.

Introduction, from page 4
dificult to protect children than
adults. As Fatima Goss Graves and
Adaku Onyeka-Crawford explain in
their article, employers are responsible if supervisors sexually harass
employees. They are responsible
if co-workers harass each other if
the employer “knew or should have
known” about the sexual harassment.
Employers can’t put their heads in
the sand to avoid liability. Yet, that
is exactly what schools can do under
Title IX after Gebser and Davis.
Under the new test, a school is not
responsible for sexual harassment or
even assault against children unless
the children provide the right authority igure with notice of the speciic
harassment and the school responds
with deliberate indifference, a high
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Kristen Galles is a civil rights lawyer
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democracy, these are important cases, and the judiciary
has a valid and vital role in our
society’s response. The importance of the issues raised in this
appeal should weigh heavily in
favor of our consideration of
them on the merits.
Id. at 1172–73 (Holloway, J., dissenting). Indeed, Justices Ginsburg
and Sotomayor dissented from the
Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in this case on the ground that the
defendants had committed a clear violation of the First Amendment. Weise
v. Casper, 562 U.S. 976, 976–77
(2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
In addition to qualiied immunity’s broad impact on the
development of constitutional law,
it has introduced a high level of
complexity into civil rights litigation. For instance, there is a great
deal of confusion about procedural
standards governing such claims,
including questions about which
party bears the burden of persuasion
on disputed facts on the immunity claim. Teressa E. Ravenell,

Hammering in Screws: Why the
Court Should Look Beyond Summary Judgment When Resolving §
1983 Qualiied Immunity Disputes,
52 vill. l. rEv. 135, 136 (2007).
Moreover, because of the factual
complexity associated with most
constitutional tort suits, litigation
costs may actually be exacerbated
by the proliferation of qualiied
immunity claims. Alan K. Chen,
The Burdens of Qualiied Immunity:
Summary Judgment and the Role of
Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47
am. U. l. rEv. 1, 101 (1997).
A inal critique of qualiied
immunity is one that is dificult to
prove empirically. Because of the
many costs associated with this
defense that I have identiied above,
plaintiffs and their attorneys may
ind that the game is not worth the
candle. To prevail on a constitutional
tort claim, which may not necessarily
involve a large monetary recovery,
the plaintiff must navigate the
dificult path that the qualiied
immunity doctrine has hewn. They
may be tied down for years litigating
qualiied immunity and defending
multiple interlocutory appeals

should they initially prevail on the
qualiied immunity claim in the trial
court. Even with the incentive of
attorney fee shifting under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988, many plaintiffs may simply
be discouraged from ever iling a
constitutional tort claim because
they anticipate that they will be
drawn into a protracted and timeconsuming dispute. The suppression
of potentially meritorious civil rights
claims is a cost of qualiied immunity
that impedes access to justice in
profound and troubling ways.

Gonzaga’s test have recognized that
a court must analyze each statute’s
language to determine if Congress
intended to establish individual
rights enforceable through § 1983,
and that no absolute rule bars the use
of § 1983 suits to enforce such rights
in spending power statutes. See, e.g.,
Indiana Protection & Advocacy Services v. Indiana Family & Social
Services Administration, 603 F.3d
365, 378 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
Thus, Gonzaga’s test made it more
dificult, but not impossible, for lower
courts to hold that § 1983 suits allow
individual beneiciaries to sue various state or local governments under
various federal spending statutes. It
is unlikely that the current Supreme
Court will modify the strict Gonzaga

framework for using § 1983 suits to
enforce individual beneiciary rights.
However, there is enough play in Gonzaga’s approach to allow lower courts
to interpret some statutes in favor of
§ 1983 plaintiff-beneiciaries. Any
signiicant revision in the Gonzaga
framework will require a changed
Supreme Court membership that is
more sympathetic to § 1983 suits.

The author would like to thank Ellen
Giarratana, J.D. candidate, University of Denver Sturm College of Law,
for helpful research assistance.
Alan K. Chen is the William M.
Beaney Memorial Research Chair and
professor of law at the University of
Denver Sturm College of Law, where
he teaches courses in constitutional
law, federal courts, and public
interest law. An experienced civil
rights litigator and former ACLU staff
attorney, Professor Chen continues
to do pro bono work in constitutional
rights cases.

Gonzaga v. Doe, from page 3
have disagreed, for example, about
whether Gonzaga suggests individual nursing home residents have
enforceable rights under the Nursing Home Reform Amendments
(NHRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1396r et
seq. Compare Grammar v. John J.
Kane Regional Centers, 570 F.3d
520, 529–32 (3d Cir. 2009) (allowing enforcement of NHRA through
§ 1983 using Gonzaga’s test ) (2–1
decision with one judge dissenting),
with Schwerdtfeger v. Alden Long
Grove Rehabilitation & Health Care
Center, Inc., 2014 WL 1884471,
at *5–6 & n.3 (N.D. Ill. May 12,
2014) (Durkin, J.) (denying enforcement of NHRA through § 1983 and
arguing that Grammar is inconsistent with Gonzaga). Courts applying
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